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Abstract 
Emergency rules temporarily modifying migration regulation can be seen as natural experiments that can be exploited to assess 
the effectiveness of migration policies. In 2011, the Italian Government released the North Africa Emergency Provisions (ENA) 
temporarily relaxing immigration policies for refugees who fled to Italy as a consequence of the Arab Spring and the Libyan civil 
war. To take advantage of this experimental opportunity, we run difference-in-differences regressions on an original dataset to 
estimate the effects of the ENA provisions on the probability of obtaining a residence permit. The dataset includes micro-data 
self-collected from an important charity in Milan (Casa della Carità) which regularly provides migrants with legal assistance so 
as to help them to comply with immigration rules. Estimates show that such provisions actually increased the number of 
residence permits released to migrants entitled to the ENA benefits. On the other hand, migrants who were not entitled to these 
provisions suffered from exacerbated difficulties in complying with standard regulation. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of IES 2013. 
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1. Introduction 
Immigration to Italy is a phenomenon that has become relevant in the last few decades and has been largely 
impacted by the exceptional flux of citizens from countries of North Africa, mostly generated by the civil war in 
2011 in Libya and political turmoil (the Arab Spring) in Egypt and the Maghreb (Bonifazi et al. 2009, de Haas 2008, 
Del Boca and Venturini 2005, Zincone 2006). 
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All migrants in Italy face a number of specific legal and administrative issues.1 In particular, in order to live 
legally in the country, migrants are required to hold a residence permit (permesso di soggiorno). Although the latter 
is an administrative document which can be obtained from public authorities (Police) if migrants satisfy a number of 
conditions and provide standard documents, common evidence exists that many migrants cannot go through State-
provided channels in order to comply with migration rules.2 
Milan, the second largest city in Italy, hosts vibrant communities of foreign citizens, representing 19% of the 
legally resident population at the end of 2012. In the city, Casa della Carità (CdC, hereafter) is an outstanding 
example of a charity that provides individuals – both Italians and foreign citizens – with free legal assistance.3 
There is evidence that, on the occasion of their arrival to Italy, migrants tend to require not the ordinary residence 
permits for working, studying and family reasons (even if entitled) but specific types of permits which are intended 
to manage asylum-seeking procedures (namely, permits for refugees). More specifically, the Italian law (D.lgs. No. 
286/1998) establishes three different types of residence permit for foreign citizens seeking refuge. These permits are 
released by territorial Commissions and each type provides the migrant with a different level of protection. 
Accordingly, an applicant may alternatively be qualified for the status of refugee (“maximum protection”), for 
subsidiary protection (“intermediate level”) or for humanitarian protection (“minimum level”).4 
Therefore, the condition of an asylum-seeking person is often perceived as a trick to stay in the country for a 
given time (i.e. the period legally provided for the individual request to be decided by the competent authorities). 
Such a bias may thus seriously put at risk the “physiology” of applications for residence permits.5 
Such kind of difficulties occurred when the Arab Spring and the Libyan civil war broke out, as a large amount of 
refugees and migrants fled to Italy. The Government responded to the crisis with special measures, declaring a state 
of emergency.  
On April 5, 2011, recognizing the exceptional situation of North Africa, the Government adopted temporary 
measures of humanitarian protection in favor of refugees from North Africa (ENA).6 The ENA provisions, in fact, 
temporarily relaxed immigration policies, and, consequently, migrants who fled from North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) to Italy in the relevant period (January 1 – April 5, 2011)7 were automatically granted a 
temporary permit of stay for humanitarian reasons.8 On August 3, 2011, the duration of this regime was extended 
due to the persistent situation of instability in North Africa. Some specific emergency measures were lately applied 
also to migrants from other African countries (the Horn of Africa, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda). 
However, as serious difficulties emerged in the handling of the crisis, there is anecdotal evidence that this 
temporary, special protection was exploited by people who were not eligible for it (for example, this could be the 
case of individuals who were already illegally in the country).  
Therefore, the main goal of this paper is to perform an empirical analysis in order to investigate whether such a 
situation was likely to occur. Difference-in-differences (diff-in-diffs) estimation provides evidence that this 
temporary emergency rule obviously increased the number of residence permits released to migrants entitled to the 
 
 
1 The main legislative source for Italian migration regulation is the “Consolidated Act on immigration control” (D.lgs. No. 286/1998) which is 
significantly updated, year by year, by including several new specific provisions. 
2 Migrants can comply with migration rules by themselves mainly through online procedures. According to legal practitioners and the authors, 
these procedures are not easy to follow. For instance, there are different applicable permits and some payments are required (€ 14.62 in electronic 
stamps, plus an amount ranging from € 80 to 200 required to cover issuing costs). The main supporting tools provided by the State are specific 
help-desks in city halls of the major towns. 
3 People often arrive at the helpdesk of CdC with a broad array of difficulties: only when the helpdesk identifies some specific needs for legal 
advice, the user is addressed to the internal service of legal assistance.  
4 Italian regulation on refugees’ status substantially follows European Directives 2004/83/EC and 2005/85/EC. 
5 On the continuous change of status of many migrants in Italy, see Schuster (2006). 
6 According to Art. 20, D.lgs. No. 286/1998, temporary measures of protection may be established, by Decree of the President of the Council 
of Ministers, in exceptional circumstances such as armed conflicts, natural disasters and other serious situations in extra EU countries. Before the 
crisis in North Africa, this rule had been applied only once, during the Kosovo conflict in 1999. 
7 Note that only migrants who entered Italy before April 5 (date of the ENA decree) could apply for the specific protection regime. Hence, it is 
unlikely that the ENA enactment is the cause of migrants’ inflow as a means to take advantage of the associated benefits. 
8 Unlike the standard procedure, the application was free of charge and the Italian Police (Questura) was required to release these permits 
implementing specific urgent procedures. Moreover, the ENA temporary protection did not preclude subsequent requests for refugee status. 
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ENA benefits. On the other hand, however, we find that migrants who were not entitled to such provisions suffered 
from exacerbated difficulties in complying with standard regulation. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the dataset; Section 3 uses diff-in-diffs techniques to 
estimate the effects of the ENA provisions on various categories of treated groups of applicants for a residence 
permit and discusses the econometric results. Section 4 concludes and suggests some policy implications. 
 
2. Data 
We use self-collected data from CdC.9 Data refer to the period January 1, 2010 – March 31, 2013 and were coded 
using files and other documents filled by operators at CdC. The dataset contains detailed information on a share of 
the entire population of migrants living in Milan, given that in the period of observation 466 people were provided 
with legal advice at CdC. 
Statistics show an increase in the flux of foreign citizens from Africa in 2011, due to the civil war in Libya and 
political turmoil in Egypt and the Maghreb (cf. Table 2). 
As most of the individuals who come into contact with CdC are not Italian citizens (cf. Table 1), an important 
sector of the charitable legal advising activity concerns applications for a residence permit and other problems 
related to immigration (cf. Table 3). 
Concerning the rate of success in solving legal and administrative issues of the applicants, data show that 20% of 
the cases included in the analysis have been solved (cf. Table 4).10 Furthermore, there is another 32% of cases that 
have been classified as situations deemed to be solved (according to the expertise of legal advisors of CdC). As for 
this, it is important to note that a huge proportion of these “deemed-to-be-solved cases” (44%) refers to applications 
for humanitarian or subsidiary protection. 
Statistics show that the rate of success for residence permit applications improved for African migrants after the 
ENA provisions. Notably, after the enactment of the ENA regime also non-African migrants seem to have been 
impacted, although the provisions did not apply to them. In fact, the rate of success for non-African migrants after 
April 5, 2011 decreased from 64% to 43% (cf. Table 5). 
Table 1: People provided with legal assistance (Jan. 2010 – Mar. 2013), by place of origin. 
Region  No. % of total 
North Africa 122 26.18% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 214 45.92% 
Latin America 26 5.58% 
East Asia 3 0.64% 
Eastern Europe 23 4.94% 
Italy 21 4.51% 
Middle East 14 3.00% 
Indian Subcontinent 42 9.01% 
Other 1 0.21% 
Total 466 100.00% 
Source: Casa della Carità, Milano. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 www.casadellacarita.org. See, in particular, “Sportello legale”. 
10 In 84% of the solved cases the result was favorable to the applicant. 
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Table 2: No. of people by time of arrival in Italy and place of origin. 
Region 
70s 80s 90s 
2000 
– 
2004 
2005 
–  
2009 
2010 2011 2012 2013(2) N.A. Total 
North Africa 0 7 9 4 22 9 47 2 0 15 115 
Sub-Sahara 1 1 3 17 77 15 74 12 3 18 221 
Latin America 0 3 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 17 26 
East Asia 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Eastern Europe 1 1 3 4 2 2 0 0 0 10 23 
Middle East 0 0 0 0 4 4 5 1 0 0 14 
Indian Subcont. 0 0 0 0 3 5 28 3 0 3 42 
Others 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 2 12 17 28 112 35 154 18 3 64 445(1) 
            Source: Casa della Carità, Milano. 
(1) Italian citizens are not included. (2)Until March. 
Table 3: Legal and administrative issues. 
Type 
No. issues 
(1) 
% of total 
applicants (2) 
Application for residence permits 362 77.68% 
Other problems related to immigration 90 19.31% 
Issues not related to immigration 144 30.90% 
Source: Casa della Carità, Milano. 
(1)The no. of issues is larger than the no. of migrants as some individuals face more than one single problem. 
(2) Calculated on the total number of individuals (466). 
Table 4: Legal and administrative issues: outcomes. 
Type No. % of total (1) 
Solved cases 120 20.10% 
Cases deemed to be solved 194 32.50% 
Ongoing issues (2) 222 37.19% 
Cases unlikely to be solved (3) 39 6.53% 
Lost contacts (4) 22 3.69% 
 Source: Casa della Carità, Milano. 
(1) Calculated on the total number of cases (597). 
(2) Ongoing cases at March 31, 2013. 
(3)Cases that are unlikely to be favorably solved according to legal expertise by CdC.  
(4)Dismissed (e.g., the applicant’s conduct was not proper according to CdC guidelines). 
Table 5: Rate of success of the applications: migrants from countries subject to emergency and other migrants 
applying for a residence permit, January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2011. 
 Filing date % of success 
Countries subject to 
emergency 
Before ENA 54% 
After ENA 70% 
Other migrants 
Before ENA 64% 
After ENA 43% 
Source: Casa della Carità, Milano.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160   Lucia dalla Pellegrina et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  17 ( 2014 )  156 – 164 
3. Empirical analysis 
The ENA provisions of April 5, 2011 and August 3, 2011 can be viewed as a natural experiment since such 
decrees granted a temporary residence permit for humanitarian reasons to all refugees who fled from North Africa 
and other African countries subject to humanitarian emergency. If entitled, applicants received the residence permit 
according to a streamlined procedure aimed at verifying the necessary requirements. As such, the ENA regime 
appears to be a good natural experiment since it was implemented after the outbreak of the emergency and only for 
the migrants who fled to Italy from specific countries subject to humanitarian emergency before the enactment of 
the rule. Furthermore, the ENA concerned only a specific group of people, who met precise and easily verifiable 
requirements. Only if these requirements were met, time and administrative steps to obtain the permit were reduced. 
Likewise, if these conditions were not met, the application was rejected. 
To take advantage of this experimental opportunity, we run diff-in-diffs regressions to estimate the effects of the 
ENA provisions on the probability of obtaining a residence permit.11 
We estimate the following regression model: 
 
)'(],,|[E 3210 4αxx iiiiii *timeentitledαentitledαtimeααFtimeentitledobtainRP                (1) 
 
where i refers to the level of the individual migrant; obtainRP indicates whether a residence permit was accorded; 
time takes value 1 if the migrant asks for legal assistance from the time the first ENA provision was enacted (April 
5, 2011) onwards; whereas entitled is a dummy which equals 1 when the migrant fulfilled the requirements to 
benefit from the ENA treatment.12 
ix is a (݉ ൈ ͳ) vector of covariates, including date of birth, education, marital status, information regarding the 
family of origin, regional and country-of-origin fixed effects.13 All these social variables are likely to grasp a higher 
degree of vulnerability of some individuals. Accordingly, 4α is a (݉ ൈ ͳ) vector of parameters associated with these 
covariates. Dummies for the advisor and the office receiving applicants at the CdC have also been introduced. 
Finally, we assume that F is the cumulative distribution of a logistic random variable.14 All summary statistics and 
variable descriptions are reported in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Summary statistics and variable definition. 
Variable Definition % Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Obtain RP 1 if permit is obtained 0.533149     
marital_spouse_it 1 if partner in Italy 0.27    
hh_orig_home 
1 if family of origin 
resides in home country  
0.48    
edu_no 1 if no education 0.19    
birth(1) birth date  29703.86 3711.69 11967   34768 
Number of observations: 362. 
 (1)Day number 1 corresponds to 01/01/1900. 
 
As for the parameters in (1), α0 and α1 estimate the effect of the ENA provisions on the control group respectively 
before and after the treatment. Correspondingly, α2 and α3 estimate the effect on the migrants entitled to the 
application of the provision respectively before and after the treatment.  
 
 
11 Concerning diff-in-diffs technique see, among others, Abadie (2005), Angrist and Pischke (2008, Ch. 5.2) and Lechner (2011). 
12 Citizens from North African countries, African Horn, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda who arrived in Italy from January to April 2011. 
13 Other non-significant variables (gender, regular employment, dwellings, types of education) have been deleted from the set of covariates 
following a stepwise method. 
14 Since the Doornik-Hansen (2008) test for normality and the Mardia (1970) tests for multivariate skewness and kurtosis reject normality for all 
the variables and covariates in (1) we did not assume that F is normally distributed. 
161 Lucia dalla Pellegrina et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  17 ( 2014 )  156 – 164 
In Table 7 we report the Logit estimates of (1) where the treated group is represented by North African citizens 
and people from the Horn of Africa and other countries mentioned in the Presidential Decree of August 3, 2011 
(labelled entitled in the tables). However, given the number of assumptions required by nonlinear diff-in-diffs 
models (see Athey and Imbens, 2006 for a detailed discussion), parallel OLS estimates are also reported in Table 8 
for comparison. 
In general, results show that the interaction term entitled*time, associated with the effect of the ENA provisions 
on the group of entitled applicants is always positive and significant. The somehow unexpected result obtained by 
this analysis, instead, is that after the ENA the probability of obtaining a residence permit dramatically decreases for 
the control group of migrants (the parameter associated with time is always negative and significant). This confirms 
what already emerges from the descriptive statistics in the previous section. 
In order to provide robust empirical evidence we first need to avoid that the observed pattern is the pure outcome 
of events other than the ENA provisions affecting people with some characteristics in a different way from people 
with other characteristics. Political conflicts and adverse environmental conditions in the countries of origin are just 
an example of such aggregated shocks. 
Due to this possibility, we check for the robustness of our hypothesis controlling for measurable features (other 
than the ENA) which may differently affect the treated and the control group in terms of the probability of obtaining 
a residence permit during the time period considered in the analysis. In particular, in columns (a) to (e) of each table 
we report the estimates obtained for five different specifications of (1) corresponding to the progressive inclusion of 
regional and country fixed effects. In the first specification (column (a)) we omit all fixed effects but the operator 
and office dummies. In the second specification (column (b)) all regional fixed effects are accounted for, while in 
column (c) we include regional dummies which do not correspond to regions subject to the ENA provisions. Finally, 
in column (d) all national fixed effects are included, while in column (e) we include dummies for the country-of-
origin except those corresponding to nations subject to the ENA provisions.  
 
Table 7: ENA effects on success rate of applicants for a residence permit. Logit estimates. Treated group: 
citizens from North Africa, the Horn, KE, UG, SD who entered Italy between Jan. 1 and Apr. 5, 2011. 
Variable (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
time -0.160** -0.154** -0.154** -0.162** -0.162** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.072) (0.067) 
entitled 0.056 0.143 0.039 0.081 0.105 
 (0.072) (0.098) (0.088) (0.066) (0.084) 
entitled*time 0.248*** 0.257*** 0.259*** 0.248*** 0.234*** 
 (0.084) (0.086) (0.086) (0.080) (0.074) 
birth 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
marital_spouse_it 0.236*    
 (0.125)    
hh_orig_home -0.175* -0.179* -0.165* -0.264** -0.200** 
 (0.100) (0.096) (0.097) (0.103) (0.101) 
edu_no 0.330* 0.311* 0.342*   
 (0.180) (0.193) (0.187)   
constant  -0.653**   
  (0.268)   
Region dummy: NorthAfr., AfricaSub. no yes no no no 
Region dummy: East Asia, Latin 
America, Middle East, Sub India 
no yes yes no no 
Italian speaker dummy no yes yes yes yes 
Origin country dummy: all countries no no no yes no 
Origin country dummy: all countries 
expt. DZ, EG,ER, ET, KE, LY, MA, 
MR, SO, SD, TN 
no no no no yes 
Operator dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Office dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.33 0.25 
Dep. variable is obtainRP=1 if permit has been obtained. Observations: 362. Marginal effects are reported. * p<0.1; 
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at country-of-origin level in parenthesis.  
Variables “marital_spouse_it”,“edu_no”and constant term are omitted when non-significant. 
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Table 8: ENA effects on success rate of applicants for a residence permit. OLS estimates. Treated group: 
cit. from North Africa, the Horn, KE, UG, SD who entered Italy on Jan. 1 and Apr.  5, 2011. 
Variable (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
time -0.148** -0.142** -0.144** -0.141** -0.154** 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066) (0.066) 
entitled 0.056 0.139 0.042 0.149** 0.143 
 (0.066) (0.088) (0.082) (0.058) (0.089) 
entitled*time 0.226*** 0.232*** 0.238*** 0.216*** 0.223*** 
 (0.071) (0.074) (0.073) (0.069) (0.073) 
birth 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
marital_spouse_it 0.200*    
 (0.098)    
hh_orig_home -0.156* -0.160* -0.148* -0.188** -0.170* 
 (0.082) (0.080) (0.080) (0.086) (0.087) 
edu_no 0.271** 0.254* 0.284**  
 (0.124) (0.132) (0.124)  
constant 0.454*   
 (0.268)   
Region dummy: NorthAfr., AfricaSub. no yes no no no 
Region dummy: East Asia, Latin 
America, Middle East, Sub India 
no yes yes no no 
Italian speaker dummy no yes yes yes yes 
Origin country dummy: all countries no no no yes no 
Origin country dummy: all countries expt. DZ, 
EG, ER, ET, KE, LY, MA, MR, SO, SD, TN 
no no no no yes 
Operator dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Office dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.36 0.28 
Dependent variable is obtainRP=1 if permit has been obtained. Observations: 362. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p 
< 0.01. Standard errors clustered at country-of-origin level in parenthesis.  
Variables “marital_spouse_it”,“edu_no”and constant term are omitted when non-significant. 
 
Regarding the other possible biases which may alter our predictions, we exclude that the ENA enactment may 
have itself caused changes in the definition of the group of entitled migrants at the aggregate (national) level. In fact, 
as mentioned above, the ENA rules have been designed in such a way that migrants could not take advantage of 
these provisions once they had knowledge of their existence. It is not a case, indeed, that the enactment date was 
April, 5, whereas the relevant time of arrival in Italy required for eligibility was January 1 – April 5, 2011. As a 
consequence, the ENA enactment should not have, per se, generated an additional inflow of migrants from countries 
subject to the emergency wishing to exploit these special provisions. Moreover, it is worth noticing that since the 
ENA residence permits have mostly been granted according to verifiable characteristics (nationality and time of 
arrival in Italy), the probability of success should not, in principle, depend upon individual unmeasurable traits of 
the migrant.  
Still, however, some migrants could have applied for a residence permit for humanitarian reasons (mostly under 
the ENA) on the basis of their individual perception regarding the possibility of succeeding, perhaps driven by the 
euphoria generated by this exceptional situation, whereas they would have applied for ordinary permits in the 
absence of the ENA provisions. Personal traits may thus have altered the willingness to look for legal advice at CdC, 
and therefore the composition of the treatment group15 in our sample compared to the universe of migrants entitled 
to the ENA. In order to check whether this might have occurred, we have compared the ratio of entitled migrants 
applying for humanitarian reasons to the overall number of applications for work, study, and humanitarian 
protection, both at the national level and in our sample. We refer to 2011 since this is the last information available. 
At the national level we have selected two representative ENA countries, Tunisia and Morocco, which were among 
the first ten countries in terms of entries in Italy (the remaining eight countries were not subject to the emergency). 
 
 
15 If this situation concerned not entitled migrants, the success rate of the control group might drop. This possibility will be discussed in the next 
section. 
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National data show that 39.79% of the entries from Tunisia and Morocco related to application for refugee status 
and humanitarian protection. In the case of our data, 42% of the entitled migrants applied for such type of permits. 
Hence, anecdotal evidence suggests that individual attitudes are not likely to have influenced the composition of the 
treated group in our sample compared to a hypothetical treated group defined on the universe of Italian migrants. 
Besides this, we also need to verify that our model is robust to the underlying hypotheses of the diff-in-diffs 
model. The presence of a common trend before the break is unquestionably the most relevant one. However, in our 
context, such an assumption is rather difficult to test due to the relatively low number of observations which makes 
the average success rate relatively volatile, no matter the length of the time span in which it is computed. Due to this 
limit, in Figure 1 we report the success rate in the period surrounding the ENA enactment, when most of the 
observations are concentrated. The figure provides evidence of the absence of any trend, both in the treated and the 
control group.  
Finally, there is additional interesting evidence from our estimates in relation to the parameters associated with 
other covariates in Tables 7 and 8. In particular, being younger and illiterate seems to increases the probability of 
being accorded a permit. This could be justified by the fact that socially weaker individuals receive more protection. 
Conversely, having the family in the home country reduces the probability of obtaining a permit, which instead may 
indicate a major weakness of people who have no network in Italy. 
Lastly, it is worth observing that relevant contribution in explaining the variance of the dependent variable is 
exerted by country-of-origin dummies, as clearly emerges by comparing different values of both the pseudo R2 and 
R2. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Rate of success for migrants applying for a residence permit by CdC initial filing date. 
Horizontal axis: CdC initial filing date (quarterly data).   
Vertical axis: rate of success when applying for a residence permit.  
Black line, treated group (North Africa and the Horn – NAH).   
Red line: control group. 
Vertical blue line: time of the enactment of the ENA provisions. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have used data collected at CdC, an important charity in Milan, to estimate the effects of the 
North Africa Emergency rules of April 5, 2011 (ENA) and the other provisions adopted by the Italian Government 
in the context of the African crises on the probability for migrants of being accorded a residence permit.  
Results show a significant increase in the probability of obtaining a residence permit for the treated group after 
the enactment of the ENA rules. This result is somehow expected and supported by anecdotal evidence. However, 
the ENA provisions also impacted the condition of migrants in the control group, as their probability of being 
accorded a residence permit dramatically decreases after April 5, 2011.  
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As for this, a first explanation may be identified in an unwanted shifting effect: in the face of the emergency, 
some non-eligible migrants might unsuccessfully have tried to apply for the ENA regime or any another form of 
international or humanitarian protection.16 Accordingly, this effect may either be due to lack of information or 
represent the consequence of “trick” applications. From this point of view, possible policy implications would 
require better information on the part of public authorities and a more prudential attitude by legal advisors in terms 
of orienting the applicants.  
A second interpretation may simply be attributed to the difficulties connected with the handling of the crisis: the 
massive flow of newly-arrived migrants from Africa might have somehow jammed the whole administrative system, 
deteriorating the position of non-African migrants. Thereby, the ENA rules might have had an adverse effect on the 
functioning of the already overloaded authorities that decided demands for protection. Further research would thus 
require to focus on the distinction between applicants for “ordinary” residence permits (for working, studying and 
family reasons) and permits for international or humanitarian protection. In this sense, it should be expected that this 
peculiar adverse effect had a greater impact on the latter category of applicants. 
Finally, a third explanation may be referred to the implementation by public authorities of a tacit policy, aimed at 
rationing – or, at least, restraining – the amount of residence permits accorded from year to year. Although the 
Italian government does not explicitly make use of quotas with regard to requests for international or humanitarian 
protection, there is a possibility that the increase in the number of residence permits accorded to African migrants – 
due to the ENA regime and subsequent measures – was counterbalanced by a stricter attitude towards non-African 
migrants. Further research is needed to shed light on these possible explanations. 
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16 For instance, our dataset includes 9 migrants from the Indian subcontinent that explicitly applied for the ENA protection, as they probably 
expected to be considered as “Libyan escapees”. 
